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A SERIES OF LETTERS 



TO THE 



BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER. 



**-* 






NEW YORK. 



1869. 



•/yn 



Sutton, Bowne & Co., Printers, 23 Liberty street, New York. 



CORRESPONDENCE. 



No. 125 Front street, ) 
New York, February 20th, 1869. j 

To tlie Editor of the Boston Daily Advertiser : 

Dear Sir : — Your valuable paper has of late contained a series of 
letters from your regular Washington Correspondent, " Dixon," upon 
the treaty between the United States and Denmark for the purchase 
of the islands of St. Thomas and St. John, which have been read 
with great interest by myself and by many of my countrymen, Danes 
by birth, and citizens of the United States by adoption. 

These letters give, so far as we can judge, an impartial and correct, 
although very condensed, history of the negotiations which led to the 
conclusion of the treaty ; and, being very desirous of having the facts 
of the case generally known, I beg in behalf of my friends and coun- 
trymen, to ask your consent to the reprinting of those letters, for the 
purpose of having them distributed in the form of a pamphlet. 
I am, sir, very respectfully, 

your obedient servant, 

C. T. CHRISTENSEN. 



Office of the Boston Daily Advertiser, ) 

No. 29 Court street, Boston, [ 

February 22d, 1869. ) 

To General C. T. Ohristensen, -New York : 

Dear Sir: — We have no objection to the publication which you 
propose, and shall be very giad if the letters of our correspondent can 
.be made to contribute in any form to the better understanding of an 
important question. 

I remain, sir, 

very respectfully, yours, 

CHAS. F. DUNBAR. 



HISTORY OF THE ST. THOMAS TREATY. 



(prom our regular correspondent.) 

Washington, January 11, 1869. 

What shall be done with the St. Thomas treaty ? is one of the 
most embarrassing questions now before the Senate. Shall it be let 
alone, rejected, or ratified? Look at the matter as you will, and 
there are grave difficulties in the way of an adjustment. 

The negotiation for the purchase of these Danish islands began a 
good deal earlier than the public suppose. It goes back to January, 
1865 — four years ago this month. On the 7th of that month, if I am 
correct in the date, Mr. Secretary Seward and General Raasloff, the 
Danish Minister here, met at a Washington dinner party. In the 
course of the evening, Mr. Seward took General Raasloff aside, and 
then and there unfolded the idea — saying, I believe, that we wanted 
the islands for a naval station, and adding that their geographical 
position made them properly a part of this country. 

The Danish Minister, as I hear — and the matter has been a good 
deal talked about in the closer official circles for some weeks — the 
Danish Minister was surprised at the proposition, and said that he 
believed his government would be opposed to selling the islands. 
Mr. Seward wished it should be brought to the attention of the King 
of Denmark, remarking that the United States would treat upon the 
question in a liberal and chivalrous spirit. 

The Danish authorities, in due course, responded that the islands 
were not for sale, and that it was not considered advisable to nego- 
tiate on the question. This response reached here early in April, 
when Mr. Seward was confined to his bed — it will be recalled that he 
was thrown from his carriage and very seriously hurt. The answer 
was submitted to Mr. Fred. Seward, acting Secretary of State. He 
replied that he knew nothing about the matter, and could take no 
step in relation to it whatever. 

This was in Mr. Lincoln's time. I have reason to believe that Mr. 
Seward had conferred with him, and that the proposal to buy was 
made with his consent and approval. 

General Raasloff was not favorable to the sale. At that time he 
was merely the Kiug's Minister here, honored alike in private circles 
and as an official, but not, as he is now, one of the King's confiden- 
tial advisers. He reported Mr. Seward's illness, and the doubt that 
was felt as to his recovery — asking, as I understand, for instructions 
as to his course in the event of the Secretary's death and the appoint- 
ment of a new man to the State Department. He was advised to let 
the matter drop, and say nothing more about it till it was again 
brought forward by the United States. 



6 

In April came the assassination of President Lincoln, the "assault 
upon Mr. Seward, and the accession of Mr. Johnson to the Presi- 
dency. The war was ended, and all men began preparing for the- 
new order of things. Mr. Seward was long in recovering from the 
combined effect of the carriage accident and the Payne assault. It 
was not till in December of that year, 1865, that anything further 
was said about St. Thomas. A change had taken place in Danish 
affairs as well as in our own— one ministry had gone out, and there had 
come in a new ministry, more favorably disposed to Mr. Seward's 
project than the old one had been. 

The general drift of instructions from the new Danish cabinet to the 
Minister here was, that, while the government had no desire to sell, 
it was not absolutely unwilling to entertain Mr. Seward's propo- 
sition. They said, however, that if the United States wished to buy, 
the Secretary of State must show his hand and indicate what he was 
willing to give; if this were done, the King would consider whether 
or not to enter upon negotiations. This letter came near the end of 
December, and was communicated a1 the State Department a day or 
two before Mr. Seward left for Cuba. The Secretary told General 
Raasloff that he was going away, might touch at St. Thomas on his 
return, and would talk further about the purchase when he got back. 
Ihcar he gave out that the trip had nothing to do with the project 
for buying the island. Eowever this was, lie saw some of the St. 
Thomas people during his absence, and appears to have resolved that 
the purchase must be made. 

The situation duringfthe spring of 1866 was a curious one. The 
King of Denmark did not want to sell — Ml'. Seward did want to 
buy; yet we insisted, with considerable pertinacity, if I am not mis- 
informed, that Denmark should name a price|at which she would sell. 
This, General Raasloff, speaking for his'King, refused to do ; and no 
persuasion on the part of Air. Seward could induce the Danish Gov- 
ernment to recede from this position. The project would have here 
fallen through had it been in the hands of Jany one less determined 
than our'Secretary. The matter had 'been talked over more or less 
in Mr. Johnson's cabinet, and that body favored the purchase. It was 
inevitable, therefore, that we should take the^first step toward reach- 
ing the price to be paid, if we got the islands. 

In the summer of that year-General Kaasloff received permission to 
visit Denmark. On the 18th of July he left here, bearing the follow- 
ing confidential letter, handed to him by Mr. Seward on the day of its 
date when he called to take leave: 

Department ok State, ) 
Washington, July 17, 1866. f 
Sir: — I have the honor to propose to you that the United States 
will negotiate with the King of Denmark for the purchase of the Dan- 
ish Islands in the West Indies, namely, St, Thomas and the adjacent 
inlets, Santa Cruz and St. John. The United States would be wil- 
ling to pay for the same five millions of dollars in gold, payable in 
this country. Negotiation to be by treaty, which, you will of course 
understand, will require the constitutional ratification of the Senate. 



Insomuch as you propose to visit Copenhagen, the United States Min- 
ister at that place will be instructed to converse with you or with your 
government on the subject ; but should your government conclude to 
negotiate, the proceeding will be expected to be conducted here, and 
not elsewhere. 

Accept, sir, the renewed assurance of my high consideration, 

WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

This was the beginning of the end — an end yet a long way off from 
the date of the letter. General Raasloff was a good while in getting 
home, as Mr. Seward knew he would be before he started. In the 
fall of I860 he entered the ministry of the Danish Government as 
Minister of War to the King. Thereafter the business we had in 
hand was conducted with Count Frijs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
through Mr. George H. Yeaman, our Minister at Copenhagen, who 
seems to have entered into Mr. Seward's spirit from the first, and who 
conducted the negotiation in such a manner as to win from the 
Secretary warm praise. 

I have been thus particular in detailing the initial steps relating to 
this treaty, in order to show how loath the Danes were to trade, how 
Mr. Seward had to persuade them into negotiations, how reluctant 
they were to part with the islands. The subsequent history of the 
bargain finally made can be told in a few words: 

The formal offer of Mr. Seward was, I believe, laid before the 
Danish cabinet in November, 1866. They seem to have taken it as 
a part of what we call a game of bluff— they said the proposal " was 
regarded as pro forma only ; " that " the terms mentioned are out of 
the question, as Mr. Seward very well understands ;" and that " if it 
was indicated, even approximately, what sum might be expected, a 
conclusion could be had much sooner." All this winter, and through 
the spring of 1867, Mr. Seward was pressing the trade most vigorously. 
In January, 1867, he telegraphed to Mr. Yeaman, " haste is impor- 
tant." In March he demands : " We want yea or nay, now." In 
April he complains of the delay, and tells Mr. Yeaman to get an 
answer " within a short time." 

The Danes had a good deal of love for the little colony off our 
coast. Some members of the ministry were so bitterly opposed to 
the business that a rupture of the cabinet was threatened. General 
Raasloff said in March, 1867, " the idea of the sale is an unpleasant 
thing;" also, that "there are difficulties and objections to be over- 
come," and that " the smallness of the price offered is an objection to 
opening negotiations." The relations of Denmark to France and 
Prussia were on tender footing — these countries were getting ready 
for war ; if hostilities broke out what should Denmark do ? It wa 3 
believed in Copenhagen that England, France and Spain would pro- 
test against the sale of the islands, if it became known that Denmark 
was considering a proposition from us to purchase. The sale would 
offend those powers — how far could Denmark rely upon the United 
States if she got into trouble ? The correspondence of the early par* 
of 1867 shows most clearly that nothing but Mr. Seward's steady 



8 

determination could have brought about the treaty. The Danes were 
more ready any day to drop tbe business than to go on with it ; and 
it was the middle of May before the combined efforts of Mr. Seward 
and Mr. Teaman could bring the Danish Ministry to commit itself to 
paper — more than two years and four months after we broached the 
question. 

On the 17th of May, 18G7, the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs 
said the three islands would be sold for fifteen million dollars ; St. 
Thomas and St. John would be sold for ten millions ; Santa Cruz for 
five millions, subject to the approval of France ; and the consent of 
the people of the islands must be had before any transfer could be 
made. Five months were occupied in reaching a conclusion, and the 
treaty was signed October 24, 1867. We bought only St. Thomas and 
St. John — paying therefor seven and a half millions. 

The correspondence is voluminous — a great deal of it has never 
yet been shown outside of the State Department. The noticeable 
thing in it all is that the Danish government never wanted to sell, 
and that Mr. Seward never relaxed his purpose to buy. If we did a 
good thing in getting that treaty, we must thank Mr. Seward heartily, 
for nothing but his persistence through a period of more than two 
and a half years overcame the Danish objection to parting with the 
islands. 

Do you say the treaty is a bad thing, and ought to be rejected by 
the Senate ? It is to be remarked that Denmark has been persuaded 
to ratify it ; that the people of the islands have been persuaded to 
vote for us: — if we reject the treaty, how will it be with Denmark? 
"Will she and the nations of Europe have a right to say our national 
honor has been violated? This is the question which 'Mr. Sumner's 
committee is pondering. DIXON. 



HOW WE MADE THE ST. THOMAS TREATY. 

[FROM OUR REGULAR CORRESPONDENT.] 

Washington, January 13, 1809. 

In my letter of two days ago I gave the outlines of the history of the 
St. Thomas treaty. It was signed October 24, 1867, laid before the 
Senate on the 3d of December following, and has not yet been acted 
upon, even by .Mr. Sumner's committee. The Danish Government 
claims thai this delay is an indignity; that the rejection of the treaty 
would lie a grave discourtesy and a greal injustice. Denmark holds 
thai she was persuaded into the sale of the islands againsl her will 
by the persistent determination of our Government to get them; and 
thai the course of the negotiation was such as to give her a right now 
to ask that we shall keep the w onl pledged in our behalf by the 
administration. 

The question she raises is one that concerns every citizen. If I 
fully understand the matter, it is not now. as she presents it, tor us to so 



much consider whether we want tne islands, as whether we are not 
already bound in honor to take them. 

Mr. Seward's offer of five millions, contained in the transcript sent 
you two clays ago, was made July 17, 1866. In January, 1867, more 
than two years after we first asked Denmark to sell, Mr. Yeaman, 
our Minister to Copenhagen, wrote that he had talked with one of 
the King's Ministers, that " hesitation was felt in the Danish cabinet,' - 
that " the Danish Government has not yet agreed to treat of the 
matter" at all. In March of that year he wrote that the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs " does not feel ready to treat;" that " there is a desire 
to await the further development of events in Europe ;" that the idea 
of a sale " is an unpleasant thing ;" that " some of the cabinet are 
willing for the matter to be consummated, and others are not ;" and 
that " the smallness of the price is an objection to opening negotia- 
tions." On the 30th of April he wrote Mr. Seward a long letter, of 
which the following is an extract: 

" Yesterday evening I had a protracted interview with General 
Raasloff, the Secretary of War. There had been a cabinet discussion 
the previous day, and he was expected to communicate to me the 
views expressed. I learn from him, in substance, that the present 
cabinet will treat if there can be an agreement upon the terms — that 
is, the price ; though one member is so much opposed he will resign 
if the matter is effected. ... I asked him what was the material 
and specific difficulty felt by the Cabinet in making a communication 
or an offer on the subject in response to your note of last July. He 
replied that there was so great a feeling against making a definite 
offer, against saying as an offer that the government would sell for a 
definite sum, that he did not believe any communication would come 
in that form. He thought that when it came it would be rather an 
intimation of a willingness to treat, and an expression of unwillingness 
to accept the terms offered, and would leave tbe matter open in that 
form for renewed proposals from the United States ; that if other 
propositions were made and found acceptable the matter might be 
accomplished, otherwise not. It is distinctly his opinion that tbe 
feeling of the cabinet is that offers must come from the United States, 
and will not come Irom Denmark. . . . He said the cabinet !elt 
the great political importance of the cession in its effects upon the 
the relations of Denmark witli other powers, who would consider it 
as the beginning of the end of their entire colonial system in that 
quarter, and would regard the act as unkind and unfriendly in 
Denmark." 

For six months Mr. Seward urged every consideration he could 
advance, calculated to induce Denmark to enter upon the negotia- 
tion. One day he writes, " we must have an answer within a short 
time ;" another day he telegraphs, " want yea or nay now." Some of 
his messages are persuasive, others are peremptory. The President 
and cabinet back him up ; Mr. Yeaman does our work with spirit 
and intelligence. The Danes could not hold out forever, and the 
following shows by what steps the agreement as to compensation was 
reached : 

July 17, 1866 — Mr. Seward says he will give five millions for the 
three islands. April 24, 1867 — General Raasloff says that this is not 
more than half enough, and Mr. Yeaman asks the Danes to name 
their price. May 17 — Count Frijs, Minister of Foreign Affairs, offers 



10 

to sell the three for fifteen millions, or St. Thomas and St. John for 
en millions, and Santa Cruz ior five millions, the sale of the last- 
named to he subject to the consent of France. May 27 — Mr. Seward 
says he will take the whole, lot for seven and a half millions, and "the 
treaty will be ratified by the United States before a year from this 
date." June 17 — Count Frijs declines this offer, but says he will take 
thai price for St. Thomas and St. John, and half as much for Santa 
Cruz. To this Mr. Yeaman responds, by order of Mr. Seward, that 
our offer is withdrawn and the negotiations ended. The Danes 
showed no regret at this termination of the affair — it was evident that 
they were not yet seized with any great desire to sell. For three 
weeks everybody in Copenhagen supposed the matter at an end. But 
Mr. Seward knew what lie was about, Finding that his game of bluff 
accomplished nothing, he returned to business, and on the 12th of 
July, Mr. Yeaman, by his direction, closed the trade at seven and 
a half millions, for St. Thomas and St. John. This was two years and 
si\ months after we first offered to buy; a year after we proposed to 
pay five millions, and fifteen weeks before the treaty was signed. 

Denmark, on the 28th of July, 1867, a fortnight after we had said 
we would take the two islands, wants to know what we are going to 
do ahoul Santa Cruz, the third. On t' c 7th of August she renews the 
inquiry, saying she had made her proposition of May 17th as a whole, 
though willing to negotiate separately on Santa Cruz as she supposed 
that the negotiation for the other two islands " was urged forward for 
reasons of utility to the United States." On the following day Den- 
mark again says, this time in writing, " we consider our proposition 
as having been accepted as ,-i whole, although the telegraphic answer 
mentions only that part of it which can and will be immedi- 
ately acted upon." On the 5th of September she once more 
expresses a desire to know our determination about this island; and 
Mr. Yeaman writes that he thinks Frijs and Raasloff " regret" having 
fixed a separate price on it, and they " are now acting under <i sense of 
honorable obligation tn go forward with the present affair" that "they 
clea/rly expected tin whole proposition in be accepted" and that " acting 
de novo they would not now make the proposition in its present form." 

Mr. Seward had, after long persuasion, induced the Danes to nego- 
tiate — he had got hold <>l St. Thomas and St. John ; now he shows 
Denmark a new trick and says he believes, on the whole, that he does 
not want Santa Cruz. On the 23d of September lie writes that our 
proposition " had reference to our situation at the time it was con- 
ceived," that now "circumstances seem to have changed," that "we 

have come to value dollars more and dominion less," and that " the 
besl we can do is to accept the two islands upon the terms which 
.-^eeiii to liave hern agreed upon." Was not that cleverly put? Five 
davs later he assumes a still more lofty ail' and writes, " if with refer- 
ence to the presenl negotiation for the two islands it is necessary or 
convenient to the Danish government that there shall at the same 
time i>:' pending ;i questi n of an ultimate t ansfer of a third island, 
let the Danish government send us a protocol through your legation, 



11 

to be dealt with, as, on consultation, we shall find practicable and ex- 
pedient." Where will you find anything better than that ? Santa 
Cruz is utterly ignored — recognized at most in a vague manner under 
the words " a third island." On the 25th of October, by way of part- 
ing, he turns the whole thing off his mind with this : — " If Denmark 
desires to negotiate for the sale of Santa Cruz, let her make a separate 
and distinct offer by formal dispatch." That settled Denmark, so far 
as Santa Cruz was concerned. 

If there is any feature in this whole correspondence creditable to 
us 1 am not able to find it. It begins with an entreaty and ends with 
an insult, We beg Denmark to sell us the three islands — when we 
have got our grasp upon the only one of any value we snub her for 
presuming to suppose we want the others. Shall we add injury to 
insult by rejecting the treaty, or will such a rejection be for the gen- 
eral welfare and the glory of our country? These are questions 
which Mr. Sumner's committee is considering. DIXON. 



MR. SEWARD AND THE ST. THOMAS VOTE. 
[from our regular correspondent.] 

Washington, Jan. 18, 1869. 

In this St. Thomas correspondence there is nothing more worthy 
our attention than that part which relates to the taking of the vote 
of the people of the islands upon the question of a transfer to the 
United States. What was said on this question would fill three or 
four columns of the Advertiser — perhaps I can give you the pith of 
the matter in single letter. 

It was January, 1865, when Mr. Seward made his first proposal to 
buy the islands. It was May 17, 1867, when the Danish government 
consented to open negotiations. At that date Count Frijs, the Minis- 
ter of Foreign Affairs, said, in the event of a cession of the islands " the 
ratification by the Rigsdag is constitutionally necessary ; and, after 
that, the Danish governmenl will require that the consent of the peo- 
ple of the islands shall be had." On the 27th of May Mr. Seward 
wrote, " it is not believed that the consent of the people of the is- 
lands is necessary." He said they might become citizens of our 
country, might withdraw from the islands, or might remain under 
the protection of the United States. These two letters made up the 
issue, upon which many pages were written during the next five 
months. 

Early in June Mr. Seward wrote that he would allow the people to 
"reserve their allegiance for two years," and this concession Mr. Yea- 
man, in announcing it, said he hoped "would be acceptable to the 
Danish government, and that there might be no occasion for a can- 
vass and an election." On the 6th of the month Mr. Seward tele- 
graphs to Mr. Yeaman, " Denmark may take a vote at her own cost 
before, not after, she ratifies." On the 16th Mr. Yeaman has an 



12 

official interview with Count Frijs and General Raasloff, and reports 
the Count as follows : — 

" Finallv, as to the consent of the people of the islands, he ex- 
pressed the conviction of himself and his government that it could 
not be dispensed with He thought no difficulty or obstruction would 
result trom it, and said there should be no unnecessary delay in tak- 
ing the sense ot the people. But there were two reasons why, upon 
mature reflection, the government could not dispense with it. The 
modern custom in Europe on that subject was so uniform as to 
amount almost to a rule of public law, and any departure from it 
would attract marked attention ; nd comment, if not discontent. In 
addition to this, the people and the government of Denmark were 
just at this moment intensely interested in the subject of a vote of the 
people of North Schleswig, under a provision of the treaty of Prague, 
to determine for themselves their final and permanent relations with 
Denmark ; and though the two cases were not similar in their facts, 
they were similar in the importance supposed properly to belong to 
an expression of their wishes by the people of any district and coun- 
try upon the question of dissolving their former political relations 
and ties, and assuming or passing under new ones ; and that Den- 
mark might find it an impediment, or at least an unpleasant attitude 
before the world, to alienate one province without the consent of the 
people, while naturally and so justly desirous that the people of 
another distrirt should proceed to give an expression of their prefer- 
enc< s. and while hoping for such happy results from that expres- 
sion." 

On the 12th of July Mr. Yeaman writes a long letter, saying he has 
had two interview- with the Danish authorities : — " I urged very earn- 
estly that the vote in the islands should be dispensed with," but " the 
Count desired a da^- or two to think of the matter." Mr. Yeaman 
continues : 

"I have lost no opportunity to impress upon the Ministers in the 
mosl earnesl and explicit manner, the very great preference of myself 
and my government that the cession shall he absolute and not subject to 
further conditions;. that it cannot he in accordance with the interests 
orihe feelings of either government that the matter should fail after a 
treaty lias been signed; and that nothing should be done that would 
invite or present an opportunity for the interference and counter- 
influence in the islands, of those three great powers ( England, France,. 
ami Spain) which would much rather sec the matter fail than succeed ; 
and I have indicated that I am not authorized to agree to such a pro- 
posal, and that lor me to do so might jeopard the treaty at Washing- 
ton as well as in the islands. To this it is replied that there is no real 
danger of failure; that but little time will he allowed fbrforeign inter- 
ference or influence upon the election ; thai ratification by the Rigs- 
dag will he much more sure and easy if the treaty is first voted for by 
the islands ; and the effect of a contrary course upon the Schleswig 
question as heretofore urged, i> now repeated with increased emphasis 
and earnestness. The cahinet may he brought to give up the vote,. 
hut in my opinion it will not he waived. This leaves me in great 
emharassincnt, and I have telegraphed you for instructions. But I 
have resolved that if, without further instructions, it comes to be a 
question oftaMng ///> treaty with " vote, or not 'it nil, I will yield, it being 
the only ehanci left for sums*. I will press my objections as far as can 
well be done this side the point of breaking the negotiations." 

To the request for instructions, Mr. Seward, on the 12th of July, 
answers, "do not agree to submit the question." He finds cause, 
shortly how ever, for changing his mind, and on the 7th of August 



13 

writes in hearty approval of Mr. Yeaman's letter of the 12th of July, 
above quoted— thus saying, in effect, that at the last moment, ratlier 
than give up the treaty, ice would consent to the vote. The Danes insisted 
on this condition from first to last, and finally carried their point, 

Early in August three new questions came to the front— When 
shall the vote be taken ? Shall the provision for a vote be a part of 
the treaty ? Is the cession dependent upon a favorable vote of the 
people ? 

Denmark contended that the vote should be taken after the treaty 
had been ratified by the Rigsdag. Mr. Seward began by refusing to 
have any vote whatever ; after a while he consented to a vote before 
the Danish ratification. The Danes were strenuous on the point, and 
the Secretary finally yielded— agreeing to let them take it at their own 
pleasure. In fact, it was taken January 9, 1868— ten weeks after the 
treaty was signed, and more than a month after it was laid before our 
Senate. 

Denmark contended that the provision for a vote should be a part 
of the treaty, and that the cession of the islands should be dependent 
upon the consent of the people. Her position was shown in the words 
of Count Frijs, on the 16th of June, as reported above by Mr. Yeaman. 
Mr. Seward took the opposite ground on both these questions. 

The Danes wanted the provision for the vote in the treaty for the 
reason, as Mr. Yeaman wrote on the 22d of July, that it would em- 
barrass their government " if the vote must be taken, to put itself in 
the attitude of negotiating a treaty positively, and then making its 
ratification depend upon a condition or event not provided for in the 
treaty." Of the conference of the 10th of August, Mr. Yeaman 
reported as follows : 

" Count Frijs expressed his preference that, without agreeing n the 
treaty to submit the question of cession to a vote of the people of the 
islands, in such form as to make the. vote decisive as a condition, yet 
to allude to it in such a manner as to show the fact of the intention 
of the government of Denmark to take the vote. I declined to agree 
to this, upon the ground that any such reference or statement in the 
treaty might be construed as an agreement to submit, He very much 
prefers its insertion and asked me if I would take it ad referendum 
which I agreed to do." 

" We have reached a stage where failure would be positively pain- 
ful," said Mr. Yeaman on the 5th of September, in a letter to Mr. 
Seward, advising him to yield some of the disputed points. The tak- 
ing of the vote, he wrote on the 27th, they " deem a proper deference 
to modem European custom, and absolutely necessary in the present 
attitude of their other foreign relations." On the 28th, Mr. Seward 
wrote, in the pompous style often used in this correspondence, " we 
cannot now modify our previous instructions without putting the ne- 
gotiations in great jeopardy." 

On the 3d of October, Mr. Yeaman telegraphed :—" Denmark quite 
ready to conclude if vote mentioned in treaty." On the same day 
he wrote that he and Count Frijs had talked matters over—" he finds 
it necessary not only to ask the approbation of the people of the 



14 

islands, but also equally necessary that their consent or approval 
should be referred to in the treaty, though not agreed upon as a con- 
dition precedent." On the following day Mr. Seward telegraphed, 
"no condition of vote in treaty." The very next day Jie changed his 
mind and telegraphed, " waive the objection and consent that a popu- 
lar vote be taken in the islands at the instance of Denmark." That 
ended the matter, and in about two weeks thereafter the treaty was 
signed. 

I recapitulate the positions of Mr. Seward that they may be seen at 
a glance. In May he thought a vote wholly unnecessary ; in June he 
said Denmark might take a vote before ratification, but not after; in 
July he telegraphs that he will not agree to the vote at all; in August, 
by approving Mr. Ycaman's letter, he practically says that he will 
yield at the last moment and consent to a vote; in September he was 
against a vote and threatened to break off negotiations ; on the 5th of 
October he executes his great coup cPetat and yields everything at one 
stroke of the pen. 

Could anything be much more humiliating to the nation than the 
showing which Mr. Seward has made for us in this St. Thomas cor- 
respondence? It is not worth while to throw hard words at him ; the 
record he has made for himself is more severe for his condemnation 
than any language I could use. Mis way was a crooked way from first 
to last. He abused the confidence of the Danes, brought them into 
danger of a conflict with France, pledged our faith far beyond his 
warrant, put us into a false and embarrassing position before the civ- 
ilized world. What shall we do to get out of this strait into which 
he has brought us ? The question is one which Mr. Sumner's com- 
mittee is considering:. DIXON. 



HOW WE CARRIED THE ELECTION IN ST. THOMAS. 
(from our regular CORRESPOND KN I '.) 

Washington, February 8, 1869. 

On the 18th of last month I said that in this St. Thomas correspon- 
dence there was nothing more worthy our attention than the pari 
relating to the vote of the people of the islands on the question of a 
transfer to the United States. In my letter of that date I showed 
yon by what steps the contracting parties, Denmark and our Govern- 
ment, had reached an agreement on this point. I have just now 
come into possession of the documents bearing upon the work done 
in the islands, and am thus enabled to make the record complete. 
This I proceed to do, premising that there is nothing in it of which 
we have occasion to be proud. 

The Danish governmenl insisted from the first thai a vote should 
be taken— "we shall require that the consent of the people of the 
islands shall he had," said Count Frijs on the 17th of .May, 1867, when 
he consented to negotiate. From tins position he was not moved. 



15 

Mr. Seward in that same May wrote, " it is not believed that the con- 
sent of the people of the islands is necessary." To this position he 
held till six months of negotiation had convinced him that the Danes 
would not yield — then, on the 5th of October, he telegraphed to Mr 
Yeaman, " waive the objection, and consent that a popular vote be 
taken in the islands at the instance of Denmark." 

When shall the vote be taken? was a question long in dispute. 
Count Frijs said, " after the ratification," in accordance with the pre- 
cedent established when Nice and Savoy were ceded to France. The 
Danes held that this would leave our Senate and their Rigsdag free 
to act. Mr. Seward wrote, " consent is not given to await or depend 
upon the vote of the people of the islands." He seemed to fear that 
France and England would intrigue against us, and so defeat us in 
the popular vote. Letter after letter was written, argument after 
argument was advanced by Mr. Yeaman ; the Danes declared that 
there must be a vote, that the taking of it must be mentioned in the 
treaty, and that the fate of the cession must be dependent upon the 
result. They finally carried their point — yielding so far as to consent 
that the vote might be taken before, rather than after, ratification. 

The treaty was signed October 24, 1867. " I cherish the lively 
hope that what has been done at Copenhagen may be approved by 
the people of the islands, and by the President and the Senate," said 
Mr. Yeaman exuberantly on the following day in closing his long 
letter to Mr. Seward. Measures were at once taken by the Secretary 
to secure the approval of the islands. 

The Rev. Charles HaAvley, of Auburn, New York, and Rear- 
Admiral Palmer, with the Susquehanna, were sent down there "to 
cooperate with the Danish Commissioner," (Carstensen,) for the pur- 
pose of inducing the residents to vote for the transfer. Rev. Dr. 
Hawley's letter of appointment and instruction, dated October 26, 
1867, two days after the treaty was signed, contained the following 
delicious paragraph : 

"It is presumed that you will be at no loss for arguments to show, 
those who may have votes upon the subject the advantages which they 
would derive from transferring their allegiance to the United States, 
should they think proper to remain in the Islands. The market of 
this country, even now, is an eligible one for their products ; and it 
must become much more so in the event of their annexation. As 
one nf the purposes of this government in the acquisition is to secure 
a naval station, the inhabitants of the Islands will derive benefits 
from that which it is needless to expatiate upon. If, too, they should 
become a part of the domain of the United States, they ;.nd their 
posterity will have the same right to protection by a powerful gov- 
ernment in war, and to those advantages in time of peace, which are 
enjoyed by other citizens." 

" You will consider your attendance at St. Thomas as of a charac- 
ter entirely confidential," said Mr. Seward to Mr. Ilawley. All the 
consuls, and consular agents, and naval officers of the United States 
in the islands were directed to use their influence with Mr. Hawley 
in securing a favorable vote, lie reached St. Thomas on the 12th of 
November, and found Messrs Perkins and Moore, our consuls, and 



16 

Vice-Consul Simmons, already in the field. Two days thereafter he 
wrote to Mr. Seward : 

" There is much inquiry whether the United States will continue 
St. Thomas a free port. If the merchants and others connected with 
the business relations of the island could be assured that there would 
be no change in this regard, and that their trade with the other islands 
would be maintained with its present advantages, the formidable 
objection to the transfer would be obviated. The whole issue, as 
they contemplate it, resolves itself into a question of trade." 

The Danish Commissioner, Mr. Carstensen, reached St. Thomas on 
the 17th of November, and on the following day, with Mr. Hawley 
and Mr. Perkins, went over to St. Croix to see the Governor. Admi- 
ral Palmer, with his flagship, arrived at the same time. On the 22d, 
Mr. Hawley writes that he has talked a good deal with Mr. Carstensen' 
whom he found " unwilling to order an election until reasonably 
assured that the vote will be favorable." Our agent again alludes to 
the trade question — saying, in substance, that it would be easy to 
carry the vote if the people could be assured that " the present privi- 
leges and immunities enjoyed by the port will, for a time at least, 
remain undisturbed." This was the question on which the issue 
turned. How Mr. Hawley met it will appear from the reports : 

"November 22, 1807. — I have said to those with whom I have 
talked that the principal design of the United States in acquiring 
these islands being the establishment of a naval depot, I had no 
doubt there would be as little change as possible in the present status 
of the port; and that our Government would be disposed to a liberal 
policy towards its new possessions, and retain to them all rights and 
immunities not in conflict with the common interest, besides the 
advantage they would have in the protection and privileges which a 
generous and powerful government accords to all it citizens." 

"November 29, 1867.— We stated that as the object of the United 
Stairs in the acquisition of the Islands respected naval convenience 
rather than revenue, there would be a strong disposition to deal 
generously with existing privileges, by appropriate legislation; and, 
moreover, if they would accept the manifest desire of Denmark to 
cede this territory to the United States, and leave their interests with 
us, their confidence would not be misplaced." 

Two or three formal conferences were held, at which were present 
the Danish Commissioner, the Governor of the Islands, Messrs. 
Hawley, Perkins and Moore, and many leading citizens. Our agent 
and consuls reiterated the views expressed in Mr. Hawley's letters, 
saying they had every reason to believe that " the action of Congress 
would be in a spirit wholly friendly to the islands, and that their 
prosperity would be carefully fostered and guarded by our Govern- 
ment." The Governor and business men wanted something rather 
more definite on this head, and finally put into the form of three 
additional articles to the treaty the guarantees they would like to 
have the United States give. On the 1st of December Messrs. Cara- 
tensen and Hawley concluded to come to Washington and see what 
could be done in the premises — bearing the proposed articles, a strong 

tter from the Governor in support of them, and a numerously sign- 
ed memorial to the same effect from merchants and business men. 



The Danish Commissioner conferred freely with Mr. Seward, nieiri- 
bers of the Committee on Foreign Relations, several prominent mem- 
bers of Congress, and a number of other leading government officers. 
The treaty was before the Senate, its general provisions were known 
to everybody in the country, its most important article had been read 
in the House, and, so far as could be ascertained, there was no mate- 
rial objection to its ratification. Mr. Carstensen remained here nearly 
three weeks ; the Senate took no hostile action on the treaty ; neither 
Mr. Seward nor Mr. Summer's committee uttered a word of warn- 
ing ; he " was, on the contraiy, cheered on by all with whom he had 
occasion to confer;" finally he returned to St. Thomas, convinced 
that we " meant business," and determined on taking the vote imme- 
diately. 

On the 16th of December, while Mr. Carstensen was here, Mr. Sew- 
ard wrote a long letter to Mr. Hawley, in which he announced that 
the proposed additional articles could not be adopted, spoke of " the 
benignant operation of self-government in the United States," of "the 
rights and interests of the inhabitants of the ceded islands," of " the 
high and broad guarantees for the protection of life, liberty, and pro- 
perty, which the Constitution of the United States affords," and closed 
by saying that " through these constitutional guarantees the habitants 
of the ceded islands would- secure rights superior even to those which 
they have so long enjoyed as a colony under the protection of Den- 
mark." 

Mr. Carstensen called a meeting of the business men of St. Thomas 
on the 4th of January, 1868, at which these concluding words of Mr. 
Seward's letter were read as a pledge from the Government of the 
United States. They turned the scale. The election was held on the 
9th. St. John cast a unanimous vote of 205 for the cession ; the 
result in St. Thomas was 1,039 for and 22 against. And so, by Mr. 
Hawley's arguments, the presence of our fleet, the labors of Messrs. 
Perkins and Moore, the promises of Mr. Seward, and the inaction of 
Mr. Sumner's Committee and the Senate, the people of the islands 
despite the fears and anxieties of the business men and the supersti- 
tion of the lower classes, dissolved their connection with Denmark 
and declared for a union with the United States. 

That our people have been put in an embarrassing position by the 
action of Mr. Seward and the government, was revealed as soon as I 
began to examine the St. Thomas correspondence. Can the Senate 
show guiltless hands ? A word from that body while Mr. Carstensen 
was here in December, 1867, a simple resolution of warning from the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, would have stopped the proceed- 
ings in tlic islands. That word was not uttered, that resolution was 
not offered : can the Senate throw stones at Mr. Seward's glass house ? 
Have Mr. Seward, the President, the Cabinet, the Committee, and the 
Senate carried us so far that we must now ratify the treaty ? If we 
reject it, will Denmark have a right to say before the world that 
she has found the United States wanting in both honor and justice? 
Mr. Sumner's committee is pondering tins question. DIX( >X. 



18 
CAN THE ST. THOMAS TREATY BE REJECTED? 

(FROM OUR REGULAR CORRESPONDENT.) 

Washington, February 22, 1869. 
It was in January, 1865, during the Presidency of Mr. Lincoln and 
the days of the Thirty-ninth Congress, that Mr. Seward opened nego- 
tiations for the purpose of the Danish West India Islands. It was in 
October, 1867, during the Presidency of Mr. Johnson and the days of 
the Fortieth Congress, that a treaty was concluded. It will be in 
1869, during the Presidency of Mr. Grant and the days of the Forty- 
first Congress, when we take final action upon the treaty. 

Six weeks ago I began looking into the matter of the loin;' negotia- 
tion, hoping nothing more than to find the material for one or two 
readable letters to the Daily . Idvertist r. I write now as one of those 
whom the present Senate and the present Administration have com- 
promised — as one of the great body of citizens whose riyhts must be 
considered when the new Senate of the next Congress makes up its 
decision. 

The, United States is a great power and Denmark is a small power. 
If our positions were reversed — if we were the small State and Den- 
mark were the great State — I feel sure that every man of us conver- 
sant with the facts would think himself wronged if Denmark were 
to treat the United States as we have treated Denmark. We are 
strong enough to conquer any armed foe within or without : I trust 
the final event will show that we are strong enough to love honor and 
justice. 

The Danes had no wish to sell their islands — they did not ask us 
to buy them as Russia asked us to buy Alaska. Mr. Seward's urgency 
in the matter ; his temptation, through Mr. Yeaman, of an alliance 
with the United States; his special mission of the summer of 1868, 
through Senator Doolittle, to the Danish Government ; the general 
support given by our people to his foreign policy; the ratification of 
the Alaska purchase almost without objection — these were the things 
that led the Danes into the making of the St. Thomas treaty. 

The way of Mr. Seward was, as I have already said, a crooked way. 
The Danish cabinet, when it formally consented to negotiate, asked 
that the treaty, it' made, should first be ratified by the Rigsdag, then 
by the islands, finally by the United States. The Secretary for a long 
time refused to submit the matter to the islands at all, but finally con- 
sented to let them vote upon the treaty before it was taken up by the 
Rigsdag. The Danes disliked this proposition. To them it was a 
yielding of the whole question — Count Frijs told Mr. Yeaman, as 
appears from a letter in the State Department, that Denmark would 
consider herself fully committed to the treaty by a favorable vote of 
St. Thomas and San Juan. But Mr. Seward at last carried his point — 
in my letter of two weeks ago I showed by what means we secured 
the affirmative voice of the islands. He said, in one of his letters, 
that the taking of the vote was none of our concern, but an act of 
Denmark for her own satisfaction — still he had interest enough in the 



19 

business to send Rev. Dr. Hawley down, to instruct our consuls in the 
premises, and to bring Admiral Palmer and bis flag-ship into^the 
harbor. The people were at first decidedly opposed to annexation 
but Mr. Seward's assurance that through it " the inhabitants of the 
ceded islands would secure rights superior even to those which they 
have so long enjoyed as a colony under the protection of Denmark,' 
induced them to consent. This consent Denmark regarded as a 
pledge that she would ratify the treaty ; and, after action by the 
Rigsdag, it was signed by the King, on the 31st of January, 1868, in 
ample time for the exchange of ratifications, which exchange was to 
have taken place here on or before February 24th of that year. Den- 
mark did everything in a prompt and honorable manner on[her part 
to give effect to the treaty. Now let me show what Mr. Seward did 
after he had got her irrevocably committed thereto through the result 
oi the vote in the islands. 

In the last days of 1867 or the first days of 1868 — before the people 
of the islands had voted — an agent of the Government of San Domingo 
reached here with authority to negotiate about Samana. Mark the 
date — before the vote was had in St. Thomas, and while the Danish 
Commissioner and Dr. Hawley were up here to see how things looked 
and to get Mr. Seward's assurance of " rights superior." The Secre- 
tary kept his own counsel — as soon as Hawley and Carstensen were 
gone he made a basis for treating with San Domingo, sent it to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, then went before that committee 
for a talk, and gave its members the impression that he did^not want the 
St. 2 homos treaty ratified because he thought he might drive a better 
bargain for Samana. What must Denmark think of this as an illus- 
tration of thefl" liberal and chivalrous spirit" of dealing to which 
Mr. Seward, in January, 1865, pledged the United States? 

The way of the Senate was not an honorable way— indeed, it wa 
a way the United States cannot afford to have any future Senate take.s 
It received the Danish treaty from the President early in the session 
of 1867-68. The Government of Denmark knew, all the while, that 
action upon the document was required at the hands of this body. 
It had a right to ask that this action be taken within the time named 
in the treaty itself. Yet in all the twelves weeks, from December 3, 
1867, to February 24, 1868, nothing was done. The Danish Commis- 
sioner and Rev. Dr. Hawley came here the first week in December 
and remained two or three weeks. The Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions, which had the matter in charge, might properly enough have 
acted during their visit; if the islands were not wanted, we could 
have said so at once, and thus have made an end [of the whole busi- 
ness. The committee said nothing; did not even hint its purpose 
of inaction. Mr. Seward went before it and gave his views about 
Samana, and still there was no action. February came, and the 
committee, with time and inclination to attend to everything else, 
could find no day in which to pass upon this issue. At that period, a 
year ago, prior to the day fixed for the exchange of ratifications, the 
treaty might, perhaps, in spite of Mr. Seward's crooked course in the 



20 

negotiation, have been rejected without discredit to the country. 
Denmark would probably have regretted its rejection, but there could 
hardly have been any serious complaint against the United States as 
a nation ; for while the Executive had a clear right to negotiate the 
treaty, the Senate had an equally clear right to reject it. February 
went by, and then followed the months to July, in the end of which 
Congress adjourned. The Senate had not passed upon the question 
of ratification — even Mr. Sumner's committee had not passed upon it. 
An additional article was soon afterward signed, extending the 
time for the exchange of ratifications to October of this year 
Congress met again in December, three months ago, and when the 
holiday adjournment took place this St. Thomas document had not 
yet been touched. I need not assert that the course of the Senate 
with respect to the treaty was discreditable — the statement of facts is 
in itself enough. Mr. Sumner's committee held the convention for 
nine months, neither saying anything nor doing anything ; and no 
member of the body called for a report on the question it had been 
charged to consider. The way of this committee and this Senate is a 
way we have a right to demand shall never again be followed. 

Six or seven weeks ago General Raasloff arrived here. He was the 
Danish Minister in this country when the St. Thomas negotia- 
tions began; at their close he was, as he is now, the Danish 
Minister of War in the home government. He is here to 
close up the business in some way. It is not creditable to us that 
the causeless delay of the Senate should force Denmark to send him, 
or any one else, as a special messenger to ask action upon the treaty 
— this thing is not creditable to the United States. When he arrived 
the convention lay in one of the pigeon-holes of Mr. Sumner's com- 
mittee, where it had been quietly lying for a year. One tiling he has 
accomplished : he has compelled the committee to take it up and con- 
sider it on its merits. So much has been gained, and, in view of the 
past, this is a good deal. But a better thing yet lias been accom- 
plished — he has roused the attention of the country to the matter, so 
thai the treaty is no longer a dead parchment, but a living thing ask- 
ing a question that we must soon answer. That question is, ratify, 
or reject ? 

The new administration will bring in a new order of things. 1 
find that when persons arc asked to look at this St. Thomas purchase, 
they can mostly see nothing but Mr. Seward, for whom there is of 
late not much love, lie will soon be out of the way — then we ought 
to be able to determine what is fair and equitable. Do we want St. 
Thomas, and is it worth the money we have bargained to gft e? An- 
sw er these questions affirmatively, and there is no need to speak fur- 
ther. For my part, 1 am satisfied that it would be far better to pay 
seven and a half millions for St. Thomas and San Juan than lake 
Samana and the whole of St. Domingo as a gift. There are some 
presents thai a nation cannot afford to accept, and St. Domingo and 
its people are one of these. Have Mr. Sew aid and the Senate so in- 



21 

volved us that honor and justice alike require us to ratify this treaty ? 
The new President, the new Secretary of State, and the Senate in the 
next Congress, must consider this question. It raises an issue which 
the country cannot wisely ignore. Denmark is a small power ; but 
the answer we make will be heard through the civilized world. 

DIXON. 



APPENDIX. 



THE TEXT OF THE TREATY. 



Convention between His Majesty the King of Denmark, 



THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Concerning the cession of the Islands of St. Thomas and St. John in 
the West Indies. 



His Majesty the King of Denmark and the United States of America 
being desirous of confirming the good understanding which exists 
between them, have for thai purpose appointed as Plenipotentiaries, 
his Majesty the King of Denmark, Count Christian Emil Juel Yiml 
Frijs, President of the Council of the Ministers and Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Grandcross of the Order of Danebrog, and decorated 
with the ( !ross oi honor of the same < )rder, and the Presidenl of the 
United States, George H. 5Teaman, accredited as their Minister Resi- 
dent to his said .Majesty, and the said Plenipotentiaries having ex- 
changed their full powers, which were found to be in due form, 
have agreed upon and signed the following articles: 

Article I. 
His Majesty the King of Denmark agrees to cede to the United 
States by this Convention immediately upon the exchange of the 
ratifications thereof, the islands of St. Thomas and St. John in the 

West Indies, with the adjacent, islands and rocks, situated north of the 
18th degree of north latitude. 



23 

His Majesty the King of Denmark will, however, not exercise any 
constraint over the people, and will, therefore, as soon as practicable, 
give them an opportunity of freely expressing their wishes in regard 
to this cession. 

Article II. 

In the cession of territory and dominion made by the preceding 
article are included the right of property of the crown of Denmark in 
all public lots and squares, vacant lands, and all public buildings, for- 
tifications, barracks and other edifices which are not private individual 
property. It is, however, understood that the Lutheran Congrega- 
tions shall remain in possession of the churches which are now used 
by them, and that sums due the Danish treasury by individuals are 
reserved and do not pass by this cession. 

Any government archives, papers and documents relative to the 
territory and dominion aforesaid, which may be now existing there, 
shall be left in the possession of the agent of the United States ap- 
pointed in accordance with Article IV J but an authenticated copy of 
such of them as may be required will be at all times given by the 
United States to the Danish Government, or to such Danish officers or 
subjects as may apply to them. 

Article III. 

The inhabitants of the said islands shall be protected in their liberty, 
their religion, their property ( and private rights, and they shall be free 
to remain where they now reside, or to remove at any time, retaining 
the property which they possess in the said islands, or disposing 
thereof and removing the proceeds wherever they please, without 
their being subjected on this account to any contribution, tax or 
charge whatever. Those who shall prefer to remain in the said islands , 
may either retain the title and the right of their natural allegiance, 
or acquire those of citizens of the United States. But they shall make 
their election within two years from the date of the exchange of 
ratifications of this convention ; and those who shall remain in the 
said islands after the expiration of that terms, without having declared 
their intention to retain their natural allegiance, shall be considered 
to have elected to become citizens of the United States. 

Article IV. 

Immediately after the payment by the United States of the sum of 
money stipulated for iu the fifth article of this Convention, His Majesty 
the King of Denmark will appoint an agent or agents for the purpose 
of formally delivering to a similar agent or agents, appointed on be- 
half of the United States, the territory, islands, property, and appur- 
tenances which are ceded as above, including any fortifications or 
military posts which maybe in the ceded territory, and for doing any 
other act which may be necessary in regard thereto. But the cession 
with the right of immediate possession is nevertheless to be deemed 



24 

complete and absolute on the exchange of ratifications, without wait- 
ing for such formal delivery. Any Danish troops, which may be in 
the territory or aforesaid islands, shall be withdrawn as soon as may 
be reasonably and conveniently practicable. 

Article V. 

In consideration of the cession aforesaid, the United States agree to 
pay, at the treasury in Washington, within three months after the ex- 
change of the ratifications of this convention, to the diplomatic re- 
presentative or other agent of His Majesty the King of Denmark, duly 
authorized to receive the same, seven millions five hundred thousand 
dollars, in gold. 

The cession conveys to the United States the said islands and ap- 
purtenances in full and entire sovereignty, with all the dominion, 
rights aud powers which Denmark now possesses and can exercise in 
them, free and unincumbered by any grants, conditions, privileges or 
franchises in any way affecting or limiting the exercise of such sov- 
ereignty. 

Article VI. 

When this convention shall have been duly ratified by His Majesty 
the King of Denmark, by and with the consent of the Eigsdag on the 
one part, and on the other by the President of the United States, by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, the ratifications shall 
be exchanged at Washington, within four months from the date hereof, 
or sooner if possible. 

In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this 
convention and thereto affixed the seals of their arms. 

Done at Copenhagen, the 24th of October, in the year of our Lord 
one thousand eight hundred and sixty- seven. 

Geo. II. Teaman, [l. s.] 

C. E. Juel-Vind-Frijs, [l. s.] 



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